edgeguard-owasp-feed/CVE-CHANNEL.md

The CVE channel (cve.json)

This document carries virtual patches: rules written against a named vulnerability, published as data so that every edge node enforces them within the hour instead of waiting for an engine release.

It is deliberately a second document in this repository, not a second repository and not part of rulesets.json. Each has its own build_datetime, so each is skipped or applied on its own, and a mistake in one cannot take out the other.

Engine 3.0.47 and later fetch it hourly from:

https://git.artica.center/Andre/edgeguard-owasp-feed/raw/branch/main/cve.json

When a rule belongs here, and when it does not

This document reaches every customer's agents from one hardcoded URL, so a publish is a decision taken on their behalf. It earns that only in a narrow case: an actively exploited vulnerability, recognisable in a single request, in software customers run, during the days before a real fix exists. That is a few a year.

Entry and exit, so rules do not accumulate because publishing is easy:

1. In as log. It records matches and scores nothing, so it refuses nothing while you see what it would have caught.
2. Promoted to critical only with a reason. Severity is what acts — high scores 4 against a default threshold of 5 and does nothing on its own. A rule left at high is inert, not cautious.
3. Then out. Anything still worth enforcing after the emergency moves into the engine, where it works with no network and cannot be withdrawn by a bad publish — Log4Shell, Spring4Shell and PHP2Shell all live there. Anything no longer worth it is deleted and the stamp bumped.

A rule sitting here indefinitely is in the wrong place.

And customers do not need this channel for their own rules. Create Custom Ruleset in the console takes the same fields and reaches their agents through the configuration pull, scoped to the sites they choose. The config pull is forbidden from touching the sources this feed owns and this feed is forbidden from touching theirs, so the two cannot clear each other.

Publishing a patch

Add a rule to the single ruleset, bump build_datetime, commit, push. An unchanged build_datetime means every node skips the document without reading it, so the stamp is what makes a publish take effect.

{
  "build_datetime": "2026-10-22T13:00:00Z",
  "rulesets": [{
    "id": "edgeguard-cve",
    "name": "EdgeGuard CVE Virtual Patches",
    "version": "1",
    "source": "edgeguard-cve",
    "description": "Virtual patches for named vulnerabilities",
    "enabled": true,
    "priority": 1,
    "rules": [{
      "id": "CVE-2025-31161-01",
      "name": "CrushFTP authentication bypass via crafted Authorization header",
      "pattern": "(?i)AWS4-HMAC-SHA256.*Credential=[^/]*/",
      "targets": ["headers"],
      "action": "block",
      "severity": "critical",
      "category": "cve",
      "cve": "CVE-2025-31161",
      "enabled": true,
      "references": ["https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-31161"]
    }]
  }]
}

That example is deliberately NOT the PHP upload-progress rule, which this document used to show. That CVE is patched in compiled code, so the guard below refuses it — the one example a reader was most likely to copy was the one example that could not be published. Anything already patched in code belongs in code; see the end of this page.

source must be edgeguard-cve. That is the source the channel owns and the only one it may clear, which is also what makes a rule withdrawable: remove it, bump the stamp, and it stops being enforced everywhere within the hour. Publishing an empty "rulesets": [] withdraws the lot.

Importing from a Nuclei template

A CVE record describes a vulnerability, not a request, which is why this channel is written by hand. A Nuclei template does contain the request — path, query, headers, body — because that is what it sends. So for thousands of CVEs the shape a virtual patch needs is already written down.

go run ./tools/nuclei-importer -cves CVE-2025-31161,CVE-2024-4577 \
    -merge edgeguard-rules/cve.json > /tmp/next.json
cp /tmp/next.json edgeguard-rules/cve.json
bash tools/publish-cve-feed.sh --check

Imported rules land as action: "log", and that is not timidity. A template decides whether a target was actually vulnerable by reading the RESPONSE — words in the body, the content type, the status. A WAF decides before a response exists, so the imported rule is strictly weaker than the template it came from: the template confirms exploitation, the rule only recognises the attempt. Watch what it would have caught in your own traffic, then change log to block deliberately, per rule.

Each imported rule carries an origin field saying a human did not write its pattern and what it came from. Do not remove it — it is the difference between a rule somebody reasoned about and one a converter guessed.

What it refuses to do

It skips rather than guesses, and prints why:

• A CVE the engine already patches in code. Both rules would fire and the scores would add. Five are patched today: the two PHP2Shell ones, Log4Shell (two) and Spring4Shell.
• A request with nothing literal in it. Templates are full of {{BaseURL}} and {{string_1}}; a pattern that is mostly .* matches ordinary traffic.
• A request whose longest literal is under twelve characters, or is the site root. A rule on / matches everything.

What it corrects, and why you should check anyway

It strips one leading path segment when three remain, because a template is written against a laboratory where the application is mounted somewhere: the phpunit template requests /laravel52/vendor/phpunit/... and laravel52 is that lab's directory. Without stripping it the rule is published, enabled, and unable to match a real attack at /vendor/phpunit/....

It prefers a header value carrying an injection marker (${jndi:, <%, $(, ../) over a path, and ignores standard headers entirely whatever their value. An earlier version preferred headers over everything and produced the pattern Content-Type: text/html for a PHP RCE — a rule that says nothing about the attack and something about every request.

None of that makes the output right. Read every pattern before publishing.

Targets

The usual ones (uri, query, args, body, headers, user_agent, cookies, filename, all) plus:

• param_names — the pattern is run against each parameter NAME on its own: query parameters, urlencoded body fields and multipart Content-Disposition names. An anchored pattern therefore anchors to one name, and a parameter whose value happens to be the string can never match. This is the shape CVE-2026-109618 needed and the reason it could not be written against args, where names and values arrive as one blob and ?note=PHP_SESSION_UPLOAD_PROGRESS would have been refused.

Write param_names patterns in lower case; both the original and the lowercased spelling of each name are tried.

Severity is the score

critical 5, high 4, medium 3, low 2, against a default anomaly threshold of 5. A patch that should refuse on its own is critical; one that should only contribute is medium or below. Nothing else sets the score.

Two things to get right

Do not publish a rule for a CVE the engine already patches in code. Both would fire on the same request, the anomaly score would be the sum, and the event would report one attack as two rules. TestPublishedFeedDoesNotDuplicateACompiledRule in the engine fails if this document names a CVE that ruleCVEReferences already covers.

A patch written in the hours after a disclosure is written against an advisory, not against traffic. There is no backtest. If one turns out to refuse something real, the remedy is to withdraw it — which is why withdrawal is a first-class operation here.