cve.json carries virtual patches: rules written against a named vulnerability, published as data so that every edge node enforces them within the hour instead of waiting for an engine release. Engine 3.0.47 and later fetch it hourly. It starts empty, which is a valid state and says "no virtual patches at the moment" — the engine accepts an empty rulesets list as of 3.0.47, and publishing one is also how the whole channel stands down. Separate from rulesets.json rather than part of it: each has its own build_datetime, so each is applied or skipped on its own, and a mistake in one cannot take out the other. Publishing a patch should not mean republishing a 357KB mirror of the Core Rule Set. CVE-CHANNEL.md documents the format, the param_names target, how severity becomes the anomaly score, and the two mistakes worth avoiding: publishing a rule for a CVE the engine already patches in code (both fire and the scores add), and forgetting that there is no backtest for a patch written in the hours after a disclosure — which is why withdrawal is a first-class operation here. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01N5fpE6Gu4W6JoFMXyb7t7r
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The CVE channel (cve.json)
This document carries virtual patches: rules written against a named vulnerability, published as data so that every edge node enforces them within the hour instead of waiting for an engine release.
It is deliberately a second document in this repository, not a second
repository and not part of rulesets.json. Each has its own build_datetime,
so each is skipped or applied on its own, and a mistake in one cannot take out
the other.
Engine 3.0.47 and later fetch it hourly from:
https://git.artica.center/Andre/edgeguard-owasp-feed/raw/branch/main/cve.json
Publishing a patch
Add a rule to the single ruleset, bump build_datetime, commit, push. An
unchanged build_datetime means every node skips the document without reading
it, so the stamp is what makes a publish take effect.
{
"build_datetime": "2026-10-22T13:00:00Z",
"rulesets": [{
"id": "edgeguard-cve",
"name": "EdgeGuard CVE Virtual Patches",
"version": "1",
"source": "edgeguard-cve",
"description": "Virtual patches for named vulnerabilities",
"enabled": true,
"priority": 1,
"rules": [{
"id": "CVE-2026-109618-01",
"name": "PHP upload-progress field present",
"pattern": "^php_session_upload_progress$",
"targets": ["param_names"],
"action": "block",
"severity": "critical",
"category": "cve",
"cve": "CVE-2026-109618, CVE-2026-109619",
"enabled": true,
"references": ["https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-109618"]
}]
}]
}
source must be edgeguard-cve. That is the source the channel owns and the
only one it may clear, which is also what makes a rule withdrawable: remove
it, bump the stamp, and it stops being enforced everywhere within the hour.
Publishing an empty "rulesets": [] withdraws the lot.
Targets
The usual ones (uri, query, args, body, headers, user_agent,
cookies, filename, all) plus:
param_names— the pattern is run against each parameter NAME on its own: query parameters, urlencoded body fields and multipartContent-Dispositionnames. An anchored pattern therefore anchors to one name, and a parameter whose value happens to be the string can never match. This is the shape CVE-2026-109618 needed and the reason it could not be written againstargs, where names and values arrive as one blob and?note=PHP_SESSION_UPLOAD_PROGRESSwould have been refused.
Write param_names patterns in lower case; both the original and the
lowercased spelling of each name are tried.
Severity is the score
critical 5, high 4, medium 3, low 2, against a default anomaly
threshold of 5. A patch that should refuse on its own is critical; one that
should only contribute is medium or below. Nothing else sets the score.
Two things to get right
Do not publish a rule for a CVE the engine already patches in code. Both
would fire on the same request, the anomaly score would be the sum, and the
event would report one attack as two rules.
TestPublishedFeedDoesNotDuplicateACompiledRule in the engine fails if this
document names a CVE that ruleCVEReferences already covers.
A patch written in the hours after a disclosure is written against an advisory, not against traffic. There is no backtest. If one turns out to refuse something real, the remedy is to withdraw it — which is why withdrawal is a first-class operation here.